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Mycoplasma contamination of the licensed anthrax vaccine
administered to military personnel has been suggested as a
possible cause of Persian Gulf illness. Vaccine samples tested
by nonmilitary laboratories were negative for viable myco-
plasma and mycoplasma DNA and did not support its survival.
Mycoplasma contamination of anthrax vaccine should not be
considered a possible cause of illness. 
nthrax Vaccine Adsorbed (AVA, BioPort Corporation,
Lansing, MI) is a licensed vaccine for anthrax that was
administered to approximately 150,000 U.S. military personnel
during the Persian Gulf War. It was used more recently as part
of a comprehensive vaccination policy for Department of
Defense (DOD) service members. The vaccine, which is
administered subcutaneously over an 18-month schedule, is
derived from sterile, acellular filtrates of microaerophilic cul-
tures of the avirulent, nonencapsulated V770-NP1-R strain of
Bacillus anthracis. The cultures are grown in a sterile synthetic
liquid medium devoid of enriched supplements such as serum.
The filtrates predominantly contain the protective antigen of
anthrax. The final vaccine formulation contains protective anti-
gen adsorbed to aluminum hydroxide (<2.4 mg/0.5 mL) as an
adjuvant. Formaldehyde (<0.02%) is added as a stabilizer and
benzethonium chloride (0.0025%) as a preservative. The final
product is checked for potency and safety according to U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations. 
Approximately 1.9 million doses of AVA were adminis-
tered in the United States from January 1990 through August
2000 (1), with 1,544 adverse reactions (0.08% of all injections)
reported through the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System
(2). Most of these adverse reactions were limited to the injec-
tion site; local hypersensitivity, edema, and pain were the most
commonly reported, although 76 (4.9%) of the adverse reac-
tions were classified as serious. 
The Study
Recently, Nicolson et al. (3) suggested that contamination
of this vaccine with Mycoplasma fermentans could have been
responsible for human illness specifically associated with Per-
sian Gulf syndrome. Mycoplasma contamination is considered
to be a potential problem for vaccines that are produced in cell
cultures. Such vaccines have to meet specific FDA testing
requirements to demonstrate the absence of mycoplasma con-
tamination, which is considered unlikely in vaccines that are
not cell culture-derived, such as AVA. However, in response to
the continuing controversy surrounding this vaccine, the possi-
bility of its being contaminated with mycoplasma was exam-
ined by two different techniques.
AVA was administered to U.S. personnel during Operation
Desert Storm/Desert Shield (ODS/DS), including lots FAV
001 through FAV 007. Although the lots tested in this study
were not administered to U.S. personnel deployed during ODS/
DS, the filling and potency testing of lot FAV 008 in March
1991 were contemporaneous with that of FAV 007 and were
subject to the same regulatory criteria for lot release and use.
Its use in the current vaccination program was permitted
through shelf life extension based on satisfactory potency test-
ing.
Twenty vials of AVA, including samples from four lots,
were obtained from eight DOD vaccination clinics across the
United States (Table). The tested lots represented all unexpired
vaccine available to the DOD at the time of testing. Testing of
unexpired material was deemed necessary to avoid potential
uncertainty regarding degradation of vaccine components or
analytes. 
These vials were divided into two matched sets and were
sent to two nonmilitary laboratories for testing for mycoplasma
contamination. One set was tested by culture techniques for the
presence of live organisms at the Mycoplasma Laboratory, Sci-
ence Applications International Corporation, National Cancer
Institute, Frederick Research and Development Center, Freder-
ick, MD. A commercial nongovernment facility, Charles River
Tektagen, tested the second set for mycoplasma DNA by poly-
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Table. Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed samples evaluated for
mycoplasma contamination
Vaccine lot
Expiration date Sites providing vaccinea
FAV048B
13 Apr 2002
355 Medical Squadron, Davis Monthan 
Air Force Base, AZ
N.R.C., Kansas City, MO 
Camp Pendleton USMC 
FAV047
8 Sep 2001








Davis Monthan Air Force Base, AZ
169th FW/Base Supply, McEntire ANG Station, 
Eastover, SC
aVaccine vials were shipped to Fort Detrick on cold packs. Two vials from each lot
were sent unless noted. Two vials of lot FAV047 from USAMRIID were sent to each
testing laboratory as a control.
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merase chain reaction (PCR) assay. 
Ten anthrax vaccine vials were tested for the presence of
mycoplasma by standardized cultivation methods (4-6) with
three different media. The media used for isolation were SP-4
(4), DM-1 (5), and M-CMRL (6); all three supported the
growth of  Mycoplasma organisms. Vaccine samples were
removed under Biosafety Level-2 conditions and tested both
undiluted and at a 10-fold dilution to reduce the concentrations
of stabilizer and preservative. Each culture plate was inocu-
lated with 0.1 mL of vaccine. M-CMRL plates were incubated
aerobically at 36°C, and SP-4 and DM-1 plates were incubated
anaerobically at 36°C. After 10 days, all plates were examined
microscopically. No evidence of  Mycoplasma colonies was
found in any of the culture plates inoculated with the AVA
samples. 
To determine if Mycoplasma organisms could survive in
the vaccine, which contains formaldehyde and benzethonium
chloride, a fifth lot of vaccine (FAV038) was obtained and
evaluated. This vaccine lot also tested negative. To test the
ability of Mycoplasma to survive in the vaccine, M. fermentans
strain incognitus (7) was inoculated at a concentration of 1.54
x 108 CFU per 0.1 mL into 5 mL of vaccine and mixed. Eight
serial 10-fold dilutions of this “time 0” sample were immedi-
ately plated on SP-4 agar plates. The remaining vaccine-Myco-
plasma mixture was held at 4°C and sampled at 24, 48, and 72
hours. Tenfold serial dilutions of these sequential samples were
immediately plated as described for the time 0 sample. 
All SP-4 plates were incubated for a minimum of 10 days
and examined for viable colonies. The colony growth on the
time 0 plates was atypical, with much debris on the low dilu-
tion plates. The titer of mycoplasma from the time 0 sample
was 4.2 x 105 CFU per 0.1 mL. Inactivation of the organisms
by the preservatives in the vaccine was rapid, as no growth was
detected on plates inoculated with samples taken from the
mycoplasma-vaccine mixtures held at 4°C for 24, 48, or 72
hours.
Testing for the presence of mycoplasma DNA in the sec-
ond set of AVA samples, representing four lots, was performed
by a commercial testing facility (Charles River Tektagen, Mal-
vern, PA) that used the Detection of Mycoplasma by PCR kit
(#90-100K, American Type Culture Collection, Rockville,
MD). Samples were tested first for the presence of any myco-
plasma DNA; the species  was then determined for samples
that tested positive. The vaccine samples were centrifuged
(12,000 x g for 10 minutes at 4°C) and processed for DNA
extraction according to the kit’s instructions. Samples were
amplified in a nested PCR reaction and examined by gel elec-
trophoresis. The positive control samples were M. pirum and
Acholeplasma laidlawii, and the negative control samples were
mycoplasma broth, Hut78 cell extract, and sterile RNase-free
water. All 10 of the tested AVA samples were negative for the
presence of mycoplasma DNA (Figure). 
Conclusions
No evidence was found either from culture or mycoplasma-
specific nucleic acid amplification methods to suggest that a
mycoplasma contaminant was present in the vaccine lots
tested. These results are consistent with those of a previous
report that found no evidence of such contamination in another
anthrax vaccine (8). Additionally, Mycoplasma organisms
deliberately added to AVA did not survive for even 1 day, pre-
sumably because of the preservatives added to the vaccine for-
mulation to retard adventitious agent growth. 
These results argue against assertions that this vaccine was
contaminated with Mycoplasma organisms and that such puta-
tive contamination contributed to human illness. This finding
is consistent with a serologic study of pre- and post-Gulf War
serum samples from symptomatic and asymptomatic military
personnel, which found no evidence of an association between
Gulf War illness and infection with M. fermentans (9). 
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